- Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Why conditionalize.David Lewis - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 403-407.details
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Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach.Peter Urbach & Colin Howson - 1993 - Chicago: Open Court. Edited by Peter Urbach.details
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Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading.Alvin I. Goldman - 2006 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Very Improbable Knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):971-999.details
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Review: Précis of "Knowledge and Its Limits". [REVIEW]Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):431 - 435.details
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Précis of knowledge and its limits. [REVIEW]Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):431–435.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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Stalnaker on sleeping beauty.Brian Weatherson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (3):445-456.details
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Conditionalization, a new argument for.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1999 - Topoi 18 (2):93-96.details
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Intuitive reasoning about probability: Theoretical and experimental analyses of the “problem of three prisoners”.Shinsuke Shimojo & Shin'Ichi Ichikawa - 1989 - Cognition 32 (1):1-24.details
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Knowledge---by examples.Colin Radford - 1966 - Analysis 27 (1):1--11.details
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Knowledge: By Examples.Colin Radford - 1966 - Analysis 27 (1):1.details
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Leitgeb and Pettigrew on Accuracy and Updating.Benjamin Anders Levinstein - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (3):413-424.details
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An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy.Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):236-272.details
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An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy.Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):201-235.details
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A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.details
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The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.details
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What are conditional probabilities conditional upon?Keith Hutchison - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (4):665-695.details
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The coherence argument against conditionalization.Matthias Hild - 1998 - Synthese 115 (2):229-258.details
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Justifying conditionalization: Conditionalization maximizes expected epistemic utility.Hilary Greaves & David Wallace - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):607-632.details
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Epistemic Decision Theory.Hilary Greaves - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):915-952.details
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A closer look at the probabilities of the notorious three prisoners.Ruma Falk - 1992 - Cognition 43 (3):197-223.details
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Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory.Paul Castell - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (180):377-379.details
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Conditionalization and expected utility.Peter M. Brown - 1976 - Philosophy of Science 43 (3):415-419.details
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Conditionalization and Belief De Se.Darren Bradley - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):247-250.details
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Some teasers concerning conditional probabilities.Maya Bar-Hillel & Ruma Falk - 1982 - Cognition 11 (2):109-122.details
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The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.details
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Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading.Alvin I. Goldman - 2006 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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The Mind-Body Problem: An Opinionated Introduction.David M. Armstrong - 1999 - Westview Press.details
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Higher order degrees of belief.Brian Skyrms - 1980 - In D. H. Mellor (ed.), Prospects for Pragmatism. Cambridge University Press. pp. 109--137.details
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and Assertion.Dorothy Edgington - 2009 - In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press. pp. 283.details
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Conditionals, truth and assertion.Dorothy Edgington - 2009 - In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press.details
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The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (2):166-166.details
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Indicators and Quasi-Indicators.Hector-Neri Castaneda - 1967 - American Philosophical Quarterly 4 (2):85--100.details
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How Much Common Belief is Necessary for Convention?Hyun Song Shin & Timothy Williamson - 1999 - In Cristina Bicchieri, Richard C. Jeffrey & Brian Skyrms (eds.), The Logic of Strategy. Oxford University Press.details
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Implicit learning and tacit knowledge: An essay on the cognitive unconscious.Arthur S. Reber - 1993 - Oxford University Press.details
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Rational failures of the KK principle.Timothy Williamson - 1999 - In Cristina Bicchieri, Richard C. Jeffrey & Brian Skyrms (eds.), The Logic of Strategy. Oxford University Press. pp. 101--118.details
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