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The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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De dicto internalist cognitivism.Jon Tresan - 2006 - Noûs 40 (1):143–165.details
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Doxastic freedom.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):375-392.details
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Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Précis of Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):168-172.details
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The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.details
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Clearing Space For Doxastic Voluntarism.Nishi Shah - 2002 - The Monist 85 (3):436-445.details
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Doxastic compatibilism and the ethics of belief.Sharon Ryan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):47-79.details
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II—Michael Ridge: Epistemology for Ecumenical Expressivists.Michael Ridge - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):83-108.details
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In defense of doxastic blame.Lindsay Rettler - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2205-2226.details
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Realist-Expressivism: A Neglected Option for Moral Realism.David Copp - 2001 - Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):1-43.details
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Believing at Will is Possible.Rik Peels - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):1-18.details
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Do Expressivists Have an Attitude Problem?Sebastian Köhler - 2013 - Ethics 123 (3):479-507.details
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Epistemic expressivism and the argument from motivation.Klemens Kappel & Emil F. L. Moeller - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7):1-19.details
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Believing at Will.Pamela Hieronymi - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 35 (sup1):149-187.details
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Thinking how to live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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Comments on Gibbard’s Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):699-706.details
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Meaning and normativity.Allan Gibbard - 1994 - Philosophical Issues 5:95-115.details
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Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.details
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Contextualism and knowledge attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.details
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Taking it to Heart.Jennifer Church - 2002 - The Monist 85 (3):361-380.details
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Taking it to Heart.Jennifer Church - 2002 - The Monist 85 (3):361-380.details
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What is Epistemic Blame?Jessica Brown - 2018 - Noûs 54 (2):389-407.details
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Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):167-189.details
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Aesthetic judgements and motivation.Alfred Archer - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (6):1-22.details
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The deontological conception of epistemic justification.William P. Alston - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:257-299.details
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Belief's Own Ethics.Jonathan Eric Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.details
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Meaning and Normativity.Allan Gibbard - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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The sources of normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Onora O'Neill.details
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Impassioned Belief.Michael Ridge - 2014 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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A Luxury of the Understanding: On the Value of True Belief.Allan Hazlett - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Reason Without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic Normativity.David Owens - 2000 - New York: Routledge.details
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Deciding to Believe Redux.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2014 - In Jonathan Matheson Rico Vitz (ed.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. Oxford University Press. pp. 33-50.details
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Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.details
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Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2006 - Critica 38 (114):98-107.details
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Epistemic motivation: towards a metaethics of belief.Veli Mitova - 2011 - In Andrew Evan Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.details
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Deciding to believe.Bernard Williams - 1973 - In Problems of the Self. Cambridge University Press. pp. 136--51.details
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Deciding to Believe.Carl Ginet - 2001 - In Matthias Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth and Duty. Oxford University Press. pp. 63-76.details
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Expressivism and Convention-Relativism about Epistemic Discourse.Allan Hazlett - forthcoming - In A. Fairweather & O. Flanagan (eds.), Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue. Cambridge University Press.details
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Belief's own metaethics? A case against epistemic normativity.Charles Cote-Bouchard - 2017 - Dissertation, King's College Londondetails
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The Sources of Normativity.Christine Korsgaard - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):384-394.details
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Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Accountability.Antti Kauppinen - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.details
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Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2004 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 66 (2):381-381.details
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