Despite an abundance of theoretical literature on virtue ethics in nursing and health care, very little research has been carried out to support or refute the claims made. One such claim is that ethical nursing is what happens when a good nurse does the right thing. The purpose of this descriptive, qualitative study was therefore to examine nurses’ perceptions of what it means to be a good nurse and to do the right thing. Fifty-three nurses responded to two open-ended questions: (...) (1) a good nurse is one who...; and (2) how does a nurse go about doing the right thing? Three hundred and thirty-one data units were analysed using qualitative content analysis. Seven categories emerged: personal characteristics, professional characteristics, patient centredness, advocacy, competence, critical thinking and patient care. Participants viewed ethical nursing as a complex endeavour in which a variety of decision-making frameworks are used. Consistent with virtue ethics, high value was placed on both intuitive and analytical personal attributes that nurses bring into nursing by virtue of the persons they are. Further investigation is needed to determine just who the ‘good nurse’ is, and the nursing practice and education implications associated with this concept. (shrink)

Even a brief consideration of the nature of nursing will indicate that an ethical dimension underlies much, if not all, of nursing practice. It is therefore important that students and practitioners are facilitated in developing an ethical awareness and sensitivity from early in their professional development. This paper argues that Aristotelian virtue theory provides a practice-based focus for health care ethics for a number of reasons. Also, because of his emphasis on the character of the moral agent, and on the (...) importance of perception and emotion in moral decision-making, Aristotelian virtue theory provides a useful supplement to the traditional duty-based approaches to health care ethics analysis, which are increasingly being identified in the literature as having limits to their application within the health care context. (shrink)

In this classic text, Kant sets out to articulate and defend the Categorical Imperative - the fundamental principle that underlies moral reasoning - and to lay the foundation for a comprehensive account of justice and human virtues. This new edition and translation of Kant's work is designed especially for students. An extensive and comprehensive introduction explains the central concepts of Groundwork and looks at Kant's main lines of argument. Detailed notes aim to clarify Kant's thoughts and to correct some common (...) misunderstandings of his doctrines. (shrink)

The author presents and defends three theses: (1) "the first is that it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology." (2) "the second is that the concepts of obligation, And duty... And of what is morally right and wrong, And of the moral sense of 'ought', Ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible...." (3) "the third thesis is that (...) the differences between the well-Known english writers on moral philosophy from sidgwick to the present day are of little importance." (staff). (shrink)

"Foot stands out among contemporary ethical theorists because of her conviction that virtues and vices are more central ethical notions than rights, duties, justice, or consequences--the primary focus of most other contemporary moral theorists....[These] essays embody to some extent her commitment to an ethics of virtue. Foot's style is straightforward and readable, her arguments subtle..."--Choice.

The paper asserts that the post-modern rejection of “modern” theoretical accounts including ethical-theoretical accounts as unacceptable meta-narratives would concur with an Aristotelian critique of contemporary ethical theories. Hence and Aristotelian critique will be similar to a post-modern critique. The paper sketches an account of what post-modernism in philosophy is and shows its similarity to Aristoteleanism in rejecting “modern” approaches in a significant way since an Aristotelian approach uses different criteria for what counts as ethical knowledge. The paper suggests that if (...) one follows the lead of Aristotle outlined in Book One Chapter Three of the Nichomachean Ethics applied ethics can be seen as similar to what Aristotle called “Rhetoric,” for in the Rhetoric Aristotle shows how one should engage in discourse about issues of the just and the good. The final section addresses the problem of how an Aristotelian approach can avoid the relativism of post-modernism. (shrink)

The paper asserts that the post-modern rejection of “modern” theoretical accounts including ethical-theoretical accounts as unacceptable meta-narratives would concur with an Aristotelian critique of contemporary ethical theories. Hence and Aristotelian critique will be similar to a post-modern critique. The paper sketches an account of what post-modernism in philosophy is and shows its similarity to Aristoteleanism in rejecting “modern” approaches in a significant way since an Aristotelian approach uses different criteria for what counts as ethical knowledge. The paper suggests that if (...) one follows the lead of Aristotle outlined in Book One Chapter Three of the Nichomachean Ethics applied ethics can be seen as similar to what Aristotle called “Rhetoric,” for in the Rhetoric Aristotle shows how one should engage in discourse about issues of the just and the good. The final section addresses the problem of how an Aristotelian approach can avoid the relativism of post-modernism. (shrink)

A virtue centred approach to ethics has been criticized for being vague owing to the nature of its central concept, the paradigm person. From the perspective of the practitioner the most damaging charge is that virtue ethics fails to be action guiding and, in addition to this, it does not offer any means of act appraisal. These criticisms leave virtue ethics in a weak position vis-à-vis traditional approaches to ethics. The criticism is, however, challenged by Hursthouse in her analysis of (...) the accounts of right action offered by deontology, utilitarianism and virtue ethics. It is possible to defend the action guiding nature of virtue ethics: there are virtue rules and exemplars to guide action. Insights from Aristotle’s practical approach to ethics are considered alongside Hursthouse’s analysis and it is suggested that virtue ethics is also capable of facilitating action appraisal. It is at the same time acknowledged that approaches to virtue ethics vary widely and that the challenges offered here would be rejected by those who embrace a radical replacement virtue approach. (shrink)

Kant's most familiar and widely read works in practical reason are the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and the Critique of Practical Reason (1788). His principal aims in these works are to analyze the nature and ground of morality and to justify its supreme principle (the categorical imperative). Nevertheless, in these texts, Kant also paints a picture of what it means to have a good will or good character, and it is this account of the good will and (...) the associated theory of moral motivation that have been the target of many of the historical and contemporary objections to Kant's rationalism. From the perspective of these foundational works in Kant's moral theory, it appears that all that is required for Kantian character is a firm commitment to do one's duty from the motive of duty in the absence of inclination, or in the teeth of countervailing inclination. Kant's defenders have rightly insisted that it would be hasty to draw any final conclusions about his considered views on character and moral psychology on the basis of the Groundwork and the second Critique. An adequate assessment of these kinds of charges against Kant, they have argued, must address his theory of virtue, as it is set out in his other important ethical texts, especially the Doctrine of Virtue (1797) and Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793). In his theory of virtue, Kant presents a detailed account of virtue as a character trait, provides lengthy discussions of the various virtues he sees as central for the ethical life, and maintains that there are moral feelings that are part of a virtuous character and serviceable for morality. For these reasons, those interested in gleaning a more complete picture of Kant's ethics await a detailed, systematic account of Kant's views about virtue. This entry aims to sketch the outlines of such an account. (shrink)

Kant's most familiar and widely read works in practical reason are theGroundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals(1785) and theCritique of Practical Reason(1788). His principal aims in these works are to analyze the nature and ground of morality and to justify its supreme principle (the categorical imperative). Nevertheless, in these texts, Kant also paints a picture of what it means to have a good will or good character, and it is this account of the good will and the associated theory of (...) moral motivation that have been the target of many of the historical and contemporary objections to Kant's rationalism. From the perspective of these foundational works in Kant's moral theory, it appears that all that is required for Kantian character is a firm commitment to do one's duty from the motive of duty in the absence of inclination, or in the teeth of countervailing inclination. Kant's defenders have rightly insisted that it would be hasty to draw any final conclusions about his considered views on character and moral psychology on the basis of theGroundworkand the secondCritique. An adequate assessment of these kinds of charges against Kant, they have argued, must address his theory of virtue, as it is set out in his other important ethical texts, especially theDoctrine of Virtue(1797) andReligion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason(1793). In his theory of virtue, Kant presents a detailed account of virtue as a character trait, provides lengthy discussions of the various virtues he sees as central for the ethical life, and maintains that there are moral feelings that are part of a virtuous character and serviceable for morality. For these reasons, those interested in gleaning a more complete picture of Kant's ethics await a detailed, systematic account of Kant's views about virtue. This entry aims to sketch the outlines of such an account. (shrink)

Introduces Aristotle's writings on ethics, and discusses character, intelligence, pleasure, and friendship.

Virtue ethics is perhaps the most important development within late twentieth-century moral philosophy. Rosalind Hursthouse, who has made notable contributions to this development, here presents a full exposition and defense of her neo-Aristotelian version of virtue ethics. She shows how virtue ethics can provide guidance for action, illuminate moral dilemmas, and bring out the moral significance of the emotions.

ability to understand the ongoing dynamic of the research process. This contrasts with the research team, which often spends little ...

This account of the good will has struck many readers as counterintuitive. Whereas Kant seems to think that the person in whom a sense of duty must overcome indifference or contrary inclination can and does display a good will, our intuitions about human goodness suggest that there is something deficient or lacking in the grudging agent. Aristotle, for example, would think that the grudging moralist displays continence, rather than virtue, because he thinks it is the mark of the virtuous person (...) that he does not experience a conflict between the rational and nonrational parts of the soul and that his emotions and appetites harmonize with rational judgments. (shrink)