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On the linguistic basis for contextualism.Jason Stanley - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):119-146.details
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Epistemic Norm Correspondence and the Belief–Assertion Parallel.Mona Simion - 2018 - Analysis:any048.details
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Total Adjectives vs. Partial Adjectives: Scale Structure and Higher-Order Modifiers. [REVIEW]Carmen Rotstein & Yoad Winter - 2004 - Natural Language Semantics 12 (3):259-288.details
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Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.details
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The Pragmatic Encroachment Debate.Blake Roeber - 2016 - Noûs 52 (1):171-195.details
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A defense of stable invariantism.Baron Reed - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):224-244.details
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Knowledge: By Examples.Colin Radford - 1966 - Analysis 27 (1):1.details
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A case for a certainty norm of assertion.Esben Nedenskov Petersen - 2019 - Synthese 196 (11):4691-4710.details
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Know-How and Gradability.Carlotta Pavese - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (3):345-383.details
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Treating something as a reason for action.Ram Neta - 2009 - Noûs 43 (4):684-699.details
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Epistemology Formalized.Sarah Moss - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (1):1-43.details
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Practical Certainty.Dustin Locke - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):72-95.details
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Acting on knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):361-382.details
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Assertion: A Function First Account.Christoph Kelp - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):411-442.details
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Credence as doxastic tendency.Dominik Kauss - 2020 - Synthese 197 (10):4495-4518.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.details
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Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Belief is weak.John Hawthorne, Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1393-1404.details
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How I learned to stop worrying and love probability 1.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):179-201.details
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Warrant and action.Mikkel Gerken - 2011 - Synthese 178 (3):529-547.details
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Evidence, pragmatics, and justification.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.details
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The pragmatic dimension of knowledge.Fred Dretske - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 40 (3):363--378.details
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Belief and certainty.Dylan Dodd - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4597-4621.details
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Knowledge and practical reason.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1135-1152.details
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Knowledge and Presuppositions.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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II—Does Knowledge Entail Belief?D. M. Armstrong - 1970 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 70 (1):21-36.details
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Knowledge, Practical Adequacy, and Stakes.Charity Anderson & John Hawthorne - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.details
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Knowledge First?Aidan McGlynn - 2014 - New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillian.details
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Without Justification.Jonathan Sutton - 2007 - MIT Press.details
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Scorekeeping in a Language Game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (3):339.details
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Ignorance : a case for scepticism.Peter Unger - 1975 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 166 (3):371-372.details
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Knowledge, Bets, and Interests.Brian Weatherson - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press. pp. 75--103.details
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Belief Is Credence One (in Context).Roger Clarke - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-18.details
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Knowledge and Action.J. Stanley & J. Hawthorne - 2008 - Revista Cultura E Fé 37 (144).details
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Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter Unger - 1975 - Philosophy 50 (194):489-490.details
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Knowledge in Action.Jonathan Weisberg - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13.details
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