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Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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The Work of the Will.Gary Watson - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Freedom to act.Donald Davidson - 1973 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Essays on Freedom of Action. Boston,: Routledge and Kegan Paul.details
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Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry Frankfurt - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press UK.details
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How many kinds of reasons?Maria Alvarez - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):181 – 193.details
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The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.details
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The intentionality of human action.George M. Wilson - 1980 - Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.details
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Normativity and the Will.R. Jay Wallace - 2004 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55:195-216.details
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The Possibility of Practical Reason.David Velleman - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by J. David Velleman.details
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Why Animals Can't Act.Ralf Stoecker - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):255-271.details
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Do animals have beliefs?Stephen P. Stich - 1979 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):15-28.details
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Charting control-space: Comments on Susan Hurley's Animal Action in the Space of Reasons.Kim Sterelny - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (3):257-265.details
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Animal Agency.Helen Steward - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):217-231.details
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The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.details
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Reasons Without Rationalism.Kieran Setiya - 2007 - Princeton University Press.details
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Teleological Realism: Mind, Agency, and Explanation.Scott Robert Sehon - 2005 - Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.details
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Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Basic deviance reconsidered.Markus E. Schlosser - 2007 - Analysis 67 (3):186–194.details
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The normativity of action.Mark Rowlands - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):401-416.details
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Inferring Other Minds.Daniel J. Povinelli & Steve Giambrone - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 27 (1):167-201.details
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Inferring Other Minds.Daniel J. Povinelli & Steve Giambrone - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 27 (1):167-201.details
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Darwin's mistake: Explaining the discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds.Derek C. Penn, Keith J. Holyoak & Daniel J. Povinelli - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (2):109-130.details
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Springs of action: understanding intentional behavior.Alfred R. Mele - 1992 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Intentional action.Alfred R. Mele & Paul K. Moser - 1994 - Noûs 28 (1):39-68.details
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What myth?John McDowell - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):338 – 351.details
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Response to Dreyfus.John McDowell - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):366 – 370.details
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Making Sense of Animals: Interpretation vs. Architecture.Susan Hurley - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (3):273-280.details
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Animal action in the space of reasons.Susan Hurley - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (3):231-256.details
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Agency and Actions.Jennifer Hornsby - 2004 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55:1-23.details
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Folk Psychology Under Stress: Comments on Susan Hurley’s ”Animal Action in the Space of Reasons’.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (3):266-272.details
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Making mind matter more.Jerry A. Fodor - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (11):59-79.details
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Frontiers of justice: disability, nationality, species membership.Martha C. Nussbaum (ed.) - 2006 - Belknap Press.details
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The return of the myth of the mental.Hubert L. Dreyfus - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):352 – 365.details
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Animal beliefs and their contents.Frank Dreckmann - 1999 - Erkenntnis 51 (1):597-615.details
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The Intentional Stance.Daniel Clement Dennett - 1981 - MIT Press.details
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Rational animals.Donald Davidson - 1982 - Dialectica 36 (4):317-28.details
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Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.details
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Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral reasons.Jonathan Dancy - 1993 - Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell.details
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Word, Niche and Super-Niche: How Language Makes Minds Matter More.Andy Clark - 2010 - Theoria 20 (3):255-268.details
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Opposing powers.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (2):153 - 160.details
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Why the question of animal consciousness might not matter very much.Peter Carruthers - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):83-102.details
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Two kinds of purposive action.Stephen Butterfill - 2001 - European Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):141–165.details
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Two Kinds of Purposive Action.Stephen Butterfill - 2001 - European Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):141-165.details
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How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind.Stephen A. Butterfill & Ian A. Apperly - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (5):606-637.details
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Intending and Acting: Toward a Naturalized Action Theory by Myles Brand. [REVIEW]Peter Slezak - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):49-54.details
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Thinking without words.José Luis Bermúdez - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The Importance of Being Erroneous.David Beisecker - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 27 (1):281-308.details
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Slips.Santiago Amaya - 2011 - Noûs 47 (3):559-576.details
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