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  1. Ifs and Cans.Jane Austin - 1958 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 23 (1):74-75.
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  • Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
    This is a welcome reprint of a book that continues to grow in importance.
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  • What 'Must' and 'Can' Must and Can Mean.Angelika Kratzer - 1977 - Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (3):337--355.
    In this paper I offer an account of the meaning of must and can within the framework of possible worlds semantics. The paper consists of two parts: the first argues for a relative concept of modality underlying modal words like must and can in natural language. I give preliminary definitions of the meaning of these words which are formulated in terms of logical consequence and compatibility, respectively. The second part discusses one kind of insufficiency in the meaning definitions given in (...)
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  • The Concept of Mind: 60th Anniversary Edition.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
    This now-classic work challenges what Ryle calls philosophy's "official theory," the Cartesians "myth" of the separation of mind and matter. Ryle's linguistic analysis remaps the conceptual geography of mind, not so much solving traditional philosophical problems as dissolving them into the mere consequences of misguided language. His plain language and esstentially simple purpose place him in the traditioin of Locke, Berkeley, Mill, and Russell.
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  • Responsibility, Reason, and Irrelevant Alternatives.Susan L. Hurley - 1999 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 28 (3):205-241.
  • Freedom and Necessity.A. J. Ayer - 1954 - In Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 271-284.
     
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  • Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
    What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did? We may call such explanations rationalizations, and say that the reason rationalizes the action. In this paper I want to defend the ancient - and common-sense - position that rationalization is a species of ordinary causal explanation. The defense no doubt requires some redeployment, but not more or less complete abandonment of the position, as (...)
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  • Knowing.Jason Stanley - 2011 - Noûs 45 (2):207-238.
  • A Theory of Human Action.Alvin Ira Goldman - 1970 - Englewood Cliffs, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
  • The Paradoxes of Time Travel.David Lewis - 1976 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
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  • The Paradoxes of Time Travel.David K. Lewis - 1976 - American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (2):145-152.
  • Objective Consequentialism and the Rationales of ‘ “Ought” Implies “Can” ’.Vuko Andrić - 2017 - Ratio 30 (1):72-87.
    This paper argues that objective consequentialism is incompatible with the rationales of ‘ “ought” implies “can” ’ – with the considerations, that is, that explain or justify this principle. Objective consequentialism is the moral doctrine that an act is right if and only if there is no alternative with a better outcome, and wrong otherwise. An act is obligatory if and only if it is wrong not to perform it. According to ‘ “ought” implies “can” ’, a person is morally (...)
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  • Actual–Consequence Act Utilitarianism and the Best Possible Humans.Dale E. Miller - 2003 - Ratio 16 (1):49–62.
  • Monkeys, Typewriters, and Objective Consequentialism.Eric Wiland - 2005 - Ratio 18 (3):352–360.
  • Objective Consequentialism, Right Actions, and Good People.Eric Moore - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):83 - 94.
  • Abilities.John Maier - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    In the accounts we give of one another, claims about our abilities appear to be indispensable. Some abilities are so widespread that many who have them take them for granted, such as the ability to walk, or to write one's name, or to tell a hawk from a handsaw. Others are comparatively rare and notable, such as the ability to hit a Major League fastball, or to compose a symphony, or to tell an elm from a beech. In either case, (...)
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  • Masked Abilities and Compatibilism.M. Fara - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):843-865.
    An object's disposition to A in circumstances C is masked if circumstances C obtain without the object Aing. This paper explores an analogous sense in which abilities can be masked, and it uses the results of this exploration to motivate an analysis of agents' abilities in terms of dispositions. This analysis is then shown to provide the resources to defend a version of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities against Frankfurt-style counterexamples. Although this principle is often taken to be congenial to (...)
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  • Rational Capacities, Or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion.Michael Smith - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 17-38.
    We ordinarily suppose that there is a difference between having and failing to exercise a rational capacity on the one hand, and lacking a rational capacity altogether on the other. This is crucial for our allocations of responsibility. Someone who has but fails to exercise a capacity is responsible for their failure to exercise their capacity, whereas someone who lacks a capacity altogether is not. However, as Gary Watson pointed out in his seminal essay ’Skepticism about Weakness of Will’, the (...)
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  • Knowing How.Jason Stanley & Timothy Willlamson - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.
    Many philosophers believe that there is a fundamental distinction between knowing that something is the case and knowing how to do something. According to Gilbert Ryle, to whom the insight is credited, knowledge-how is an ability, which is in turn a complex of dispositions. Knowledge-that, on the other hand, is not an ability, or anything similar. Rather, knowledge-that is a relation between a thinker and a true proposition.
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  • Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account.Kadri Vihvelin - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):427-450.
  • A Theory of Human Action.Myles Brand - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (9):249-257.
  • The Descriptive Element in the Concept of Action.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1964 - Journal of Philosophy 61 (20):613-625.
  • What We Can Do.Arthur Danto - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (15):435-445.
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  • Knowledge How.Jeremy Fantl - 2012 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Volition and Basic Action.Hugh McCann - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (4):451-473.
    The purpose of this paper is to defend the view that the bodily actions of men typicaly involve a mental action of voliton or willing, and that such mental acts are, in at least one important sense, the basic actions we perform when we do things like raise an arm, move a finger, or flex a muscle.
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  • 'Can' in Theory and Practice: A Possible Worlds Analysis.Keith Lehrer - 1976 - In M. Brand & Douglas N. Walton (eds.), Action Theory. Reidel. pp. 241-270.
  • Knowing How and Knowing That: The Presidential Address.Gilbert Ryle - 1946 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 46:1 - 16.
  • The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
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  • Intention.P. L. Heath - 1960 - Philosophical Quarterly 10 (40):281.
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  • A Theory of Human Action.Les Holborow - 1973 - Philosophical Quarterly 23 (91):180-182.
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  • Utilitarianism: Two Difficulties.H. J. McCloskey - 1973 - Philosophical Studies 24 (1):62 - 63.
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  • The Rejection of Objective Consequentialism.Frances Howard-Snyder - 1997 - Utilitas 9 (2):241-248.
    Objective consequentialism is often criticized because it is impossible to know which of our actions will have the best consequences. Why exactly does this undermine objective consequentialism? I offer a new link between the claim that our knowledge of the future is limited and the rejection of objective consequentialism: that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ and we cannot produce the best consequences available to us. I support this apparently paradoxical contention by way of an analogy. I cannot beat Karpov at chess in (...)
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  • Consequentialism and the "Ought Implies Can" Principle.Elinor Mason - 2003 - American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (4):319-331.
    It seems that the debate between objective and subjective consequentialists might be resolved by appealing to the ought implies can principle. Howard-Snyder has suggested that if one does not know how to do something, cannot do it, and thus one cannot have an obligation to do it. I argue that this depends on an overly rich conception of ability, and that we need to look beyond the ought implies can principle to answer the question. Once we do so, it appears (...)
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  • The Rejection of Objective Consequentialism: A Comment: Mozaffar Qizilbash.Mozaffar Qizilbash - 1999 - Utilitas 11 (1):97-105.
    Frances Howard-Snyder argues that objective consequentialism should be rejected because it violates the principle of ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ in asking us to do what we cannot. In this comment I suggest that Howard-Snyder does not take sufficiently seriously the chief defence of objective consequentialism, which reformulates it so that it applies only to actions we can perform. Nonetheless, I argue that there are arguments relating to ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ which discredit objective consequentialism even if it is thus reformulated. These arguments (...)
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  • Response to Carlson and Qizilbash.Frances Howard-Snyder - 1999 - Utilitas 11 (1):106-111.
  • The Oughts and Cans of Objective Consequentialism.Erik Carlson - 1999 - Utilitas 11 (1):91-96.
    Frances Howard -Snyder has argued that objective consequentialism violates the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. In most situations, she claims, we cannot produce the best consequences available, although objective consequentialism says that we ought to do so. Here I try to show that Howard -Snyder's argument is unsound. The claim that we typically cannot produce the best consequences available is doubtful. And even if there is a sense of ‘producing the best consequences’ in which we cannot do so, objective consequentialism (...)
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  • It's the Thought That Counts.Frances Howard-Snyder - 2005 - Utilitas 17 (3):265-281.
    Agnes's brakes fail. Should she continue straight into the busy intersection or should she swerve into the field? Add to the story, what Agnes does not and cannot know, that continuing into the intersection will cause no harm, whereas swerving into the apparently empty field will cause a death. I evaluate arguments for the claim that she should enter the intersection, i.e. for objectivism about right and wrong; and arguments for the claim that she should swerve, i.e. for subjectivism about (...)
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  • The Search for Basic Actions.Annette Baier - 1971 - American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (2):161 - 170.
  • A Theory of Volition.Charles Ripley - 1974 - American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (2):141 - 147.