The relational wrong of Poverty

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 26 (2):303-319 (2023)
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Abstract

In this paper I explore elements from Kant’s philosophy of right to develop a relational account of the wrong of poverty. Poverty is a relational wrong because it involves relations of problematic dependence, inequality, and humiliation. Such relations infringe the rights to freedom and equality of the poor. And the called-for response is one of public recognition and protection of the rights of the poor. This position means we must radically reconceptualize our individual duties to the poor: not _private beneficence_, but _private remedies for public failures_.

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Ariel Zylberman
University At Albany (SUNY)

Citations of this work

A Kantian Moral Response to Poverty.Violetta Igneski - 2023 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 26 (2):255-269.
Kant on punishment and poverty.Nicholas Hadsell - 2024 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):193-210.

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References found in this work

Kantian Ethics.Allen W. Wood - 2007 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Famine, Affluence, and Morality.Peter Singer - 1985 - In Lawrence A. Alexander, International Ethics: A Philosophy and Public Affairs Reader. Princeton University Press. pp. 247-262.
Laws of freedom.Mary J. Gregor - 1963 - Oxford,: Blackwell.
Freedom and poverty in the Kantian state.Rafeeq Hasan - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):911-931.

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