Updating theories

Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1):375-395 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Kuipers' choice to let logical models of a theory represent the applications or evidence of that theory leads to various problems in ICR. In this paper I elaborate on four of them. 1. In contrast to applications of a theory, logical models are mutually incompatible. 2. An increase and a decrease of a set of models both represent an increase of logical strength; I call this the ICR paradox of logical strength. 3. The evidence logically implies the strongest empirical law. 4. A hypothesis and its negation can both be false. My conclusion therefore reads that we should not identify (newly invented) applications of a theory with its logical models, but with partial models that can be extended to the logical model(s) of the language used to formulate the theory. As an illustration I give a model theoretical account, based on partial models, of the HD-method and crucial experiments.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,100

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
6 (#1,463,802)

6 months
2 (#1,203,099)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Sjoerd D. Zwart
Delft University of Technology

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references