Mind 120 (478):447-483 (2011)

Authors
Michael Zimmerman
University of North Carolina, Greensboro
Abstract
The fitting-attitudes analysis of value, which states that something's being good consists in its being the fitting object of some pro-attitude, has recently been the focus of intense debate. Many objections have been levelled against this analysis. One objection to it concerns the ‘challenge from partiality’, according to which it can be fitting to display partiality toward objects of equal value. Several responses to the challenge have been proposed. This paper criticizes these and other responses and then offers a response that, it is claimed, solves the challenge
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzr029
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References found in this work BETA

Brentano and the Buck-Passers.Sven Danielsson & Jonas Olson - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):511 - 522.

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Citations of this work BETA

Intrinsic Vs. Extrinsic Value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Value and Reasons to Favour.Jonathan Way - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8.
Consequentializing.Douglas W. Portmore - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (2):329-347.
Policy Externalism.Daniel Drucker - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):261-285.
In Defense of the Wrong Kind of Reason.Christopher Howard - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):53-62.

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