Partiality and Intrinsic Value

Mind 120 (478):447-483 (2011)
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Abstract

The fitting-attitudes analysis of value, which states that something's being good consists in its being the fitting object of some pro-attitude, has recently been the focus of intense debate. Many objections have been levelled against this analysis. One objection to it concerns the ‘challenge from partiality’, according to which it can be fitting to display partiality toward objects of equal value. Several responses to the challenge have been proposed. This paper criticizes these and other responses and then offers a response that, it is claimed, solves the challenge

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Michael Zimmerman
University of North Carolina, Greensboro

Citations of this work

Intrinsic vs. extrinsic value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Towards an account of basic final value.Timothy Perrine - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Consequentializing.Douglas W. Portmore - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (2):329-347.
Value and reasons to favour.Jonathan Way - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8.
Policy Externalism.Daniel Drucker - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3).

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