Utilitas 18 (4):329-361 (2006)
Abstract |
Many philosophers hold that whether an act is overall morally obligatory is an ‘objective’ matter, many that it is a ‘subjective’ matter, and some that it is both. The idea that it is or can be both may seem to promise a helpful answer to the question ‘What ought I to do when I do not know what I ought to do?’ In this article, three broad views are distinguished regarding what it is that obligation essentially concerns: the maximization of actual value, the maximization of expected value, and the perceived maximization of actual value. The first and third views are rejected; the second view is then refined and defended. The unfortunate upshot is that there may be no very helpful answer to the question just mentioned. As to the question posed in the title of the article, the answer unsurprisingly depends on what ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ are taken to mean. (Published Online November 24 2006).
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DOI | 10.1017/s0953820806002159 |
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References found in this work BETA
Conditional Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives.P. S. Greenspan - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (10):259-276.
The Paradoxes of Deontic Logic: The Simplest Solution to All of Them in One Fell Swoop.Hector-Neri Castañeda - 1981 - In Risto Hilpinen (ed.), New Studies in Deontic Logic. pp. 37--85.
Foreseeable Consequence Utilitarianism.Bart Gruzalski - 1981 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (2):163 – 176.
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Citations of this work BETA
Right in Some Respects: Reasons as Evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2191-2208.
Why Maximize Expected Choice‐Worthiness?1.William MacAskill & Toby Ord - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):327-353.
Do We Really Need a Knowledge-Based Decision Theory?Davide Fassio & Jie Gao - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7031-7059.
View all 26 citations / Add more citations
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