Could extended objects be made out of simple parts? An argument for "atomless gunk"

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):1-29 (1996)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Let us say that an extended object is “composed wholly of simples” just in case it is an aggregate of absolutely unextended parts spread throughout an extended region—that is, just in case there is a set S such that: every member is a point-sized part of the object, and for every x, x is part of the object if and only if it has a part in common with some member of S. Could a truly extended substance be composed entirely of unextended parts? Reflection upon the fact that it must be at least possible for extended objects to touch one another suggests that the answer to this question is: No.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Are Bolzano’s Substances Simple?Andrej Krause - 2006 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 80 (4):543-562.
Hudson on Location. [REVIEW]Josh Parsons - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):427 - 435.
A Gunk-Friendly MaxCon.Gregory Fowler - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):611 – 627.
A tale of two simples.Joshua Spencer - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):167 - 181.
Qualitative Unity and the Bundle Theory.David Robb - 2005 - The Monist 88 (4):466-92.
Composition as a fiction.Gideon Rosen & Cian Dorr - 2002 - In Richard Gale (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Metaphysics. Blackwell. pp. 151--174.
Illusions of gunk.J. Robert G. Williams - 2006 - Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):493–513.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
346 (#55,955)

6 months
41 (#91,823)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Dean Zimmerman
Rutgers University - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

Monism: The Priority of the Whole.Jonathan Schaffer - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):31-76.
Fundamentality.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Is there a fundamental level?Jonathan Schaffer - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):498–517.
Spacetime the one substance.Jonathan Schaffer - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (1):131 - 148.
Location and Mereology.Cody Gilmore, Claudio Calosi & Damiano Costa - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 71 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references