Is conscious will an illusion?

Disputatio 1 (16):58-70 (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this essay I critically examine Daniel Wegner’s account of conscious will as an illusion developed in his book The Illusion of Conscious Will (MIT Press, 2002). I show that there are unwarranted leaps in his argument, which considerably decrease the empirical plausibility and theoretical adequacy of his account. Moreover, some features essential to our experience of willing, which are related to our general understanding of free will, moral responsibility and human agency, are largely left out in Wegner’s account of conscious will. This substantially diminishes its implications and significance for some profound philosophical issues.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 94,726

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-02-08

Downloads
30 (#533,137)

6 months
12 (#311,829)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

The Phenomenology of Agency.Tim Bayne - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):182-202.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Illusion of Conscious Will.Daniel M. Wegner - 2002 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions.J. R. Stroop - 1935 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 18 (6):643.
Freedom evolves.Daniel Clement Dennett - 2003 - New York: Viking Press.

View all 26 references / Add more references