Abstract

Dai Zhen 戴震 criticizes Song-Ming 宋明 Neo-Confucianism, especially Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 dichotomy between principle and desires and his claim that principle is received from Heaven and completely embodied in the heart/mind, as if Zhu advocates asceticism and ultra-intuitionism. This criticism culminates in the accusation of “using principle as a means of killing or persecuting people.” In this paper, I argue that Dai Zhen misunderstands Zhu Xi’s moral theory and does not do him justice. At some point Dai’s criticism is similar to the utilitarian criticism of deontology. However, more interesting are Dai’s unique ideas, especially his arguments for desires that covertly appeal to the immanent-monist trends of thought in the Ming-Qing 明清 period. His own ethical enterprise lies in dismissing Song Confucians’ notion of ethics as revealing principles a priori, and then establishing criteria or procedures that enable common moral deliberation.