Abstract

Scheler’s critique of Kant and his concept of a priori does, on the one hand, show a notable debt to Husserl, although Scheler adds to and deepens Husserl’s critique. On the other hand, however, Scheler also criticises Husserl’s own understanding of the concept of a priori. The material a priori as an ideal object in Husserl is, above all, connected with the so-called “Bolzanian turn”. Scheler’s critique of Husserl is rendered more profound as he increasingly penetrates the depth of the relation between Bolzano and Husserl. According to Scheler Husserl does not subscribe to soulless Platonism, allow he always conducts himself in a Platonist way. He subscribes instead to neo-Platonism, or rather to logical Platonism. Because the phenomenological reduction in Husserl is not, according to Scheler, conducted in a “pure” way, Husserl’s phenomenological experience (categorical intuition) is problematic. More exactly the relation between categorical and sensory intuition is problematic. Scheler’s ultimate goal is to ensure a primary status for categorical intuition and its contents (material a priori), as well as for the moral view and its correlates (material values), and last, but not least, for the phenomenologically material value ethics.