Consciousness and Cognition 8 (2):225-59 (1999)
AbstractThe visual brain consists of several parallel, functionally specialized processing systems, each having several stages (nodes) which terminate their tasks at different times; consequently, simultaneously presented attributes are perceived at the same time if processed at the same node and at different times if processed by different nodes. Clinical evidence shows that these processing systems can act fairly autonomously. Damage restricted to one system compromises specifically the perception of the attribute that that system is specialized for; damage to a given node of a processing system that leaves earlier nodes intact results in a degraded perceptual capacity for the relevant attribute, which is directly related to the physiological capacities of the cells left intact by the damage. By contrast, a system that is spared when all others are damaged can function more or less normally. Moreover, internally created visual percepts-illusions, afterimages, imagery, and hallucinations-activate specifically the nodes specialized for the attribute perceived. Finally, anatomical evidence shows that there is no final integrator station in the brain, one which receives input from all visual areas; instead, each node has multiple outputs and no node is recipient only. Taken together, the above evidence leads us to propose that each node of a processing-perceptual system creates its own microconsciousness. We propose that, if any binding occurs to give us our integrated image of the visual world, it must be a binding between microconsciousnesses generated at different nodes. Since any two microconsciousnesses generated at any two nodes can be bound together, perceptual integration is not hierarchical, but parallel and postconscious. By contrast, the neural machinery conferring properties on those cells whose activity has a conscious correlate is hierarchical, and we refer to it as generative binding, to distinguish it from the binding that might occur between the microconsciousnesses
Similar books and articles
Probing unconscious visual processing with the Mccollough effect.G. Keith Humphrey & Melvyn A. Goodale - 1998 - Consciousness and Cognition 7 (3):494-519.
The visual system and levels of perception: Properties of neuromental organization.Petra Stoerig & Stephan Brandt - 1993 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 14 (2).
Computational implications of gestalt theory: The role of feedback in visual processing.Steven Lehar - 2002
Conscious visual representations built from multiple binding processes: Evidence from neuropsychology.Glyn W. Humphreys - 2003 - In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Temporal binding, binocular rivalry, and consciousness.Andreas K. Engel, Pascal Fries, Peter König, Michael Brecht & Wolf Singer - 1999 - Consciousness and Cognition 8 (2):128-51.
The hot fringes of consciousness: Perceptual fluency and affect.Rolf Reber & Norbert Schwarz - 2001 - Consciousness and Emotion 2 (2):223-231.
Two visual systems and two theories of perception: An attempt to reconcile the constructivist and ecological approaches.Joel Norman - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):73-96.
Reference, perception, and attention.Athanasios Raftopoulos - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (3):339 - 360.
One visual system with two interacting visual streams.Jason S. McCarley & Gregory J. DiGirolamo - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):112-113.
What and where in the human visual system: Two hierarchies of visual modules.L. M. Vaina - 1990 - Synthese 83 (1):49-91.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience.Ned Block - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.
Consciousness cannot be separated from function.Michael A. Cohen & Daniel C. Dennett - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (8):358--364.
The function of phenomenal states: Supramodular interaction theory.Ezequiel Morsella - 2005 - Psychological Review 112 (4):1000-1021.
Consciousness and cognitive access.Ned Block - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):289-317.
Homing in on consciousness in the nervous system: An action-based synthesis.Ezequiel Morsella, Christine A. Godwin, Tiffany K. Jantz, Stephen C. Krieger & Adam Gazzaley - 2016 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39:1-70.
References found in this work
Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.
The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of Consciousness.Gerald Edelman - 1989 - Basic Books.
Toward a neurobiological theory of consciousness.Francis Crick & Christof Koch - 1990 - Seminars in the Neurosciences 2:263-275.