The Epistemological Status of Theoretical Models of Molecular Structure

Hyle 6 (1):17 - 34 (2000)
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Abstract

For many decades, chemists regarded rigid models of molecular structure as representing structures of real molecules as their attributes. However, new experimental data required a new theoretical conceptualization. The rigid model has been replaced with a dynamic model in which molecular structure is changed under the influence of environmental conditions. The above case shows some problems connected with recognizing theoretical models as structural representations of real empirical systems. Owing to the fact that theoretical models of molecular structure obtain local interpretations with a procedural character, they can be carriers of specific information about structures of real molecules. Finally, I argue that, although theoretical models can be well corroborated empirically, they cannot be treated as representations of real empirical systems but can play a very important role in experimental practice

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