Holding the Faith True

Res Philosophica 90 (2):161-170 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that the objections to both doxastic volitionism and doxastic voluntarism fail. Objections to doxastic volitionism and doxastic voluntarism assume a generic notion of belief, a notion which covers both beliefs about things which we know or think we know or are evident to us, as well as beliefs which have some degree of credence but are not clearly evident to the subject. The generic notion of belief includes both sorts of beliefs, but the position against doxastic volitionism is supported only by appeal to beliefs about things which are evident or that we think we know. However, by showing that beliefs which we think we know to be true are not voluntary, the objections leaves open the question whether belief as such is voluntary. Contrary to the opponents of doxastic volitionism, I will show that if what we are after is a generic notion of belief, it ought to be construed as holding true; and if this is what constitutes belief as such, the arguments against doxastic volitionism for faith beliefs fail. The strongest argument against doxastic voluntarism is an evidentialist argument concerning the ethics of belief. That argument is basically that even if choosing belief is psychologically possible, evidentialism rules it out as epistemically irresponsible. In the last section of this article, I will argue that if religious belief is constituted by true propositions of the faith, the evidentialist objection to doxastic voluntarism fails.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,991

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Freedom and (theoretical) reason.Margaret Schmitt - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):25-41.
Doxastic Voluntarism: A Sceptical Defence.Danny Frederick - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (1):24-44.
The Powers that bind : doxastic voluntarism and epistemic obligation.Neil Levy & Eric Mandelbaum - 2014 - In Jonathan Matheson (ed.), The Ethics of Belief. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 12-33.
Volitionism and Voluntarism about Belief.Pascal Engel - 2002 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):265-281.
Doxastic Voluntarism.Mark Boespflug & Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Doxastic Voluntarism and Self-Deception.Anthony R. Booth - 2007 - Disputatio 2 (22):115 - 130.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-06-12

Downloads
64 (#258,947)

6 months
8 (#416,172)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

John Zeis
Canisius College

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Epistemological puzzles about disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.
Believing by faith: an essay in the epistemology and ethics of religious belief.John Bishop - 2007 - New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press.
Prolegomena to a philosophy of religion.J. L. Schellenberg - 2005 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Belief, faith, and acceptance.Robert Audi - 2008 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 63 (1):87-102.

View all 15 references / Add more references