Logical Aliens? Eine Verallgemeinerung und Verteidigung der Psychologismus-Kritik Freges gegen Wittgensteins Naturalismus

Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 76 (4):580-605 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX


The fundamental laws of logic hold independently of us. Thus, if there were beings who thought in contradiction to these laws, they would be in error. The paper defends this stance of Frege's against Wittgenstein's combination of logical constitutivism and logical naturalism. Frege's arguments against psychologism are more general than his usual wording suggests and are, at their core, directed against the whole of logical naturalism. Contrary to prevailing opinions on this subject, I argue that constitutivism alone cannot deflect Frege's attack. Rather, constitutivism is neutral to the opposition between logical realism and logical naturalism. The later Wittgenstein was not only a constitutivist, but, as will be explained, also a logical naturalist. By shedding new light on the logical alien problem, I attempt to apply Frege's generalized arguments to Wittgensteinian naturalism. This naturalism inevitably leads to a radical and self-undermining relativism.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,642

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library


Added to PP

36 (#458,158)

6 months
74 (#71,717)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ufuk Özbe
Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references