No State A Priori Known to Be Factive is Mental

Philosophical Issues 26 (1):462-492 (2016)
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10.1111/phis.12080

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Elia Zardini
Complutense University of Madrid

Citations of this work

Closed without boundaries.Elia Zardini - 2020 - Synthese 199 (Suppl 3):641-679.
K ⊈ E.Elia Zardini - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):540-557.

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References found in this work

Kritik der reinen Vernunft.Immanuel Kant - 2020 - Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.

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