How is Dissensus Possible in Consensual Theories? Habermas and Brandom

Abstract

The presentation focuses on the problem of dissensus in Brandom’s and Habermas’ theories of communication and social action. The main questions it raises concern: the concept of dissensus, the main characteristics if it, the possibility of its occurring and indispensable conditions for it. It also claims that Brandom’s account, in opposition to that of Habermas, is more likely to permit rationally based dissensus.

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Tomasz Zarębski
University of Lower Silesia

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