Determinism and Moral Responsibility According to Avicenna's Theory of Action

Philosophical Investigations 16 (38):287-314 (2022)
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Abstract

The main issue of this article is how to harmonize determinism and moral responsibility (the classic problem of free will) by reconsidering the philosophy of Avicenna. Certainly, Avicenna believes in determinism and in various works has emphasized the necessity of the effect by its sufficient cause. Avicenna, on the other hand, certainly believes in the moral responsibility of autonomous agents, including human beings. We have shown in the first step that he denies free will in the libertarian sense (the ability to do otherwise) for any agents; Because this notion of free will requires objective possibilities and is not compatible with causal determinism. Avicenna has identified a new type of voluntary agent who does not need to have an over-intentional intention to do something. Here, he looks very similar to proponents of agent causation; His idea, however, was not intended to defend a libertarian notion of free will, but to get rid of the challenge of the infinite regress of wills. Hence, Avicenna can be considered one of the few proponents of the "compatibilist agent causation." In the second step, an overview of Avicenna's theory of action is drawn. Here, in particular, emphasis is placed on the activity of the soul in the stages of the causal process leading to action, and the quality of these activities is introduced as a criterion for the morality degree of the agent..

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References found in this work

An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.
Free Will: A Contemporary Introduction.Michael McKenna & Derk Pereboom - 2014 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Derk Pereboom.
Causal determinism.Carl Hoefer - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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