Bring back the magic

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):391–402 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Magical ersatzism is the view that possible worlds are primitive abstract entities. In On the Plurality of Worlds, David Lewis presented what appeared to many to be a devastating argument against magical ersatzism. In this paper, I show that Lewis’ central argument does not succeed. Magical ersatzism remains a viable theory of possible worlds.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,122

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
77 (#205,221)

6 months
3 (#760,965)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references