Abstract

The importance of epistemic values in science is universally recognized, whereas the role of non-epistemic values is sometimes considered disputable. It has often been argued that non-epistemic values are more relevant in applied sciences, where the goals are often practical and not merely scientific. In this paper, we present a case study concerning earthquake engineering. So far, the philosophical literature has considered various branches of engineering, but very rarely earthquake engineering. We claim that the assessment of seismic hazard models is sensitive to both epistemic and non-epistemic values. In particular, we argue that the selection and evaluation of these models are justified by epistemic values, even if they may be contingently influenced by non-epistemic values. By contrast, the aggregation of different models into an ensemble is justified by non-epistemic values, even if epistemic values may play an instrumental role in the attainment of these non-epistemic values. A careful consideration of the different epistemic and non-epistemic values at play in the choice of seismic hazard models is thus practically important when alternative models are available and there is uncertainty in the scientific community about which model should be used.