Diametros 18 (68):1-14 (2020)

Authors
Jay Zameska
University of Tartu
Abstract
In this commentary on Torbjörn Tännsjö’s Setting Health-Care Priorities, I argue that sufficientarianism provides a valuable perspective in considering how to set health care priorities. I claim that pace Tännsjö, sufficientarianism does offer a distinct alternative to prioritarianism. To demonstrate this, I introduce sufficientarianism and distinguish two forms: Tännsjö’s “weak sufficientarianism” and an alternative strong form of sufficientarianism that I call “revised lexical sufficientarianism.” I raise a problem for Tännsjö’s sufficientarianism, and advocate for the revised view on this basis. I then demonstrate that in the area of population ethics, the revised view outperforms the other views Tännsjö considers. As such, I aim to demonstrate that sufficientarianism — understood as its own theory and not just as a form of prioritarianism — offers unique advantages in population ethics, and would have been a valuable complement to the other theories Tännsjö considers.
Keywords Setting Health-Care Priorities  Torbjörn Tännsjö  distributive ethics  health-care  maximin/leximin  population ethics  priority setting  repugnant conclusion  sufficientarianism  utilitarianism
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.33392/diam.1605
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,043
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Equality as a Moral Ideal.Harry Frankfurt - 1987 - Ethics 98 (1):21-43.
Why Sufficiency is Not Enough.Paula Casal - 2007 - Ethics 117 (2):296-326.
Equality, Priority, and Compassion.Roger Crisp - 2003 - Ethics 113 (4):745-763.
The Prospects for Sufficientarianism.Liam Shields - 2012 - Utilitas 24 (1):101-117.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Challenges for Principles of Need in Health Care.Niklas Juth - 2015 - Health Care Analysis 23 (1):73-87.
The Difficulties of Sufficientarianism.Yingying Tang - 2017 - Philosophical Forum 48 (2):161-174.
The Indispensability of Sufficientarianism.Anders Herlitz - 2019 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 22 (7):929-942.
Why Sufficientarianism is Not Indifferent to Taxation.Philipp Kanschik - 2015 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):81-102.
Sufficientarianism and the Separateness of Persons.Shlomi Segall - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):142-155.
The Prospects for Sufficientarianism.Liam Shields - 2012 - Utilitas 24 (1):101-117.
Some Questions, and Answers, for Sufficientarians.Liam Shields - 2016 - In Carina Fourie & Annette Rid (eds.), What is Enough? Sufficiency, Justice, and Health. Oxford, UK: pp. 85 - 100.
The Significance of the Concept of Disease for Justice in Health Care.Thomas Schramme - 2007 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 28 (2):121-135.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2021-01-26

Total views
9 ( #947,086 of 2,498,739 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #422,193 of 2,498,739 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes