Topoi 38 (1):251-260 (2019)

Dan Zahavi
University of Copenhagen
One of the central questions within contemporary debates about collective intentionality concerns the notion and status of the we. The question, however, is by no means new. At the beginning of the last century, it was already intensively discussed in phenomenology. Whereas Heidegger argued that a focus on empathy is detrimental to a proper understanding of the we, and that the latter is more fundamental than any dyadic interaction, other phenomenologists, such as Stein, Walther and Husserl, insisted on the importance of empathy for proper we-experiences. In this paper, I will present some of the key moves in this debate and then discuss and assess Husserl’s specific proposal, according to which reciprocal empathy, second-person engagement and self-alienation are all important presuppositions for group-identification and we-identity.
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DOI 10.1007/s11245-016-9444-6
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References found in this work BETA

The Nature of Sympathy.Max Scheler - 2008 - Transaction Publishers.

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Citations of this work BETA

Intercorporeity and the First-Person Plural in Merleau-Ponty.Philip J. Walsh - 2020 - Continental Philosophy Review 53 (1):21-47.
Collective Intentionality and Plural Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness.Dan Zahavi - 2018 - Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (1):61-75.
Phenomenological Approaches to Personal Identity.Jakub Čapek & Sophie Loidolt - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (2):217-234.
We in Me or Me in We? Collective Intentionality and Selfhood.Dan Zahavi - 2021 - Journal of Social Ontology 7 (1):1-20.

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