Later Wittgenstein on Doubt and Certainty

Journal of Philosophical Investigations at University of Tabriz 8 (14):93-112 (2014)
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Abstract

Later Wittgenstein, by making a distinction between knowledge and certainty, gives a new approach to criticize skepticism. According to him, certainty is prior to doubt and knowledge. He believes that certainty is something different from knowledge on which it is based in practice and not in belief and knowledge. According to later Wittgenstein, certainty is the primary form of language game which does not need to be justified. He believes that there are some propositions which could not be said that we know them and could not be doubted. He calls them, “hinge propositions” and maintains that our world- picture is made by those propositions. These propositions are the foundation of our language games and researches. Wittgenstein believes that although these are certain propositions, but it does not follow that they are incorrigible and correspond to reality. This kind of certainty is based on our attitudes towards reality. In this paper we are going to explain later Wittgenstein's theory of certainty and show that whether his theory could solve the problem of skepticism in epistemology.

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