When and why Conventions cannot Be Social Institutions

Philosophia 48 (3):1235-1254 (2020)
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Abstract

The paper focuses on the issue of compatibility of social institution and convention. At first, it introduces the modest account of conventionality building on five distinctive features – interdependence, arbitrariness, mind-independence, spontaneity, and normative-neutrality – which constitute conventional behaviour, then it presents the two major theories of social institutions that explain them in terms of rules, or equilibria. The argument is that conventions cover a wide-ranging area and cannot be identified with the category of institutions because it would be too restrictive and contradictory to the initial modest account.

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Vojtěch Zachník
University of Hradec Králové