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Abstract
In discussions concerning affectivity several points of view, often opposed, are admitted. However, the common point of current standpoints is a belief that affectivity is a homogeneous family of phenomena. This belief leads to problems because the collected data are determined by a kind of accepted approach. In order to achieve a better consideration of these data and to avoid an exclusion of this or that position, another perspective is proposed. Following Max Scheler, we can adopt a hierarchical view of feelings. The distinction between what seems to be different, opposed or even contradictory appears as the result of a distinction of levels of the same general phenomena: affectivity. Scheler is not the only philosopher to sustain a hierarchical conception of feelings. We can refer to Th. Ribot, Plato or R. Ingarden and N. Hartmann. In this, however, a hierarchical conception of feelings results from a more general perspective: a hierarchical conception of psychic reality. Besides a hierarchy of feelings, a second perspective should be added: all feelings are divided into genera and, on the other hand, each genus is divided into species. Genera of feelings are to be understood as modi of experienced relatedness of the ego to the object of feeling, the levels of which are to be understood as units of functions similar in the degree to which a subject of feelings is involved in an act of feeling.
Keywords Conference Proceedings  Contemporary Philosophy
Categories No categories specified
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ISBN(s) 978-1-63435-038-9
DOI 10.5840/wcp23201828704
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