Abstract

In Republic VI-VII, Plato claims not only that even if one were to have knowledge other than knowledge of the Form of the Good, one would not benefit from that knowledge unless one has knowledge of the Form of the Good, and unless one knows the Form of the Good, one cannot know any particular good, but also, arguably, that unless one knows the Form of the Good, one cannot be ethically good . In Nicomachean Ethics I.6, however, Aristotle denies not only the existence of the Form of the Good, but also the usefulness of the Form of the Good with respect to ethical goodness. To argue against the existence of the Form of the Good, Aristotle argues that there are many natures of goodness and no one general nature of goodness, through his belief in the ambiguity of 'good' and categories. Aristotle argues against the usefulness of the Form of the Good to ethical goodness as follows: The experts of practical and productive pursuits are ignorant of and do not seek knowledge of the Form of the Good, and would not benefit from knowledge of the Form of the Good. For this argument, Aristotle assumes that one can be an expert in a practical pursuit without being an expert in any theoretical pursuit , and that the Form of the Good, were it to exist, would be the object of a theoretical science. I respond on Plato's behalf by arguing, with the aid of his writings, that craftspersons seek knowledge of the appropriate Form in doing their work, would benefit in their craft from having knowledge of the Form of the Good, and therefore that it is necessary for craftspersons to seek knowledge of the Form of the Good in doing their work. If such knowledge is necessary for craftspersons, I argue, it is necessary for students of ethics as well