Journal of Social Philosophy 42 (3):321-340 (2011)

Benjamin S. Yost
Cornell University
One of the many arguments against capital punishment is that execution is irrevocable. At its most simple, the argument has three premises. First, legal institutions should abolish penalties that do not admit correction of error, unless there are no alternative penalties. Second, irrevocable penalties are those that do not admit of correction. Third, execution is irrevocable. It follows that capital punishment should be abolished. This paper argues for the third premise. One might think that the truth of this premise is self-evident. But in his paper “Is the Death Penalty Irrevocable?” Mike Davis argues that it is false: the death penalty is not irrevocable. While Davis’ argument is itself somewhat compelling, it receives additional support from work in the metaphysics of death, specifically the literature on posthumous harm. Strengthened in this way, the argument deserves careful consideration. I begin with a quick sketch of Davis’ argument, then show how the Pitcher-Feinberg theory of posthumous harm enables a more robust argument against the irrevocability of capital punishment, defending their theory of harm against standard objections in the literature. Having established the coherency of the robust argument, I conclude that it nevertheless fails to make the case against irrevocability. This is because it ignores the full set of practical requirements incumbent on legal institutions that wrongly punish someone.
Keywords death penalty  capital punishment  philosophy of law  punishment  posthumous harm
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9833.2011.01537.x
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References found in this work BETA

Harm to Others.Joel Feinberg - 1987 - Oxford University Press USA.
Harm to Others.Martin P. Golding - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):295-298.
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The Misfortunes of the Dead.George Pitcher - 1984 - American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (2):183 - 188.

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The Structure of Death Penalty Arguments.Matt Stichter - 2014 - Res Publica 20 (2):129-143.

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