Husserl’s Theory of Belief and the Heideggerean Critique

Husserl Studies 25 (2):121-140 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I develop a “two-systems” interpretation of Husserl’s theory of belief. On this interpretation, Husserl accounts for our sense of the world in terms of (1) a system of embodied horizon meanings and passive synthesis, which is involved in any experience of an object, and (2) a system of active synthesis and sedimentation, which comes on line when we attend to an object’s properties. I use this account to defend Husserl against several forms of Heideggerean critique. One line of critique, recently elaborated by Taylor Carman, says that Husserl wrongly loads everyday perception with explicit beliefs about things. A second, earlier line of critique, due to Hubert Dreyfus, charges Husserl with thinking of belief on a problematic Artificial Intelligence (AI) model which involves explicit rules applied to discrete symbol structures. I argue that these criticisms are based on a conflation of Husserl’s two systems of belief. The conception of Husserlian phenomenology which emerges is compatible with Heideggerean phenomenology and associated approaches to cognitive science (in particular, dynamical systems theory).

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,764

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Mathematizing phenomenology.Jeffrey Yoshimi - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):271-291.
Husserl: an analysis of his phenomenology.Paul Ricœur - 1967 - Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press. Edited by Edward G. Ballard, Lester Embree & David Carr.
Heidegger's critique of Husserl's and Brentano's accounts of intentionality.Dermot Moran - 2000 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):39-65.
Heidegger's early critique of Husserl.Søren Overgaard - 2003 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (2):157 – 175.
Philosophical essays in memory of Edmund Husserl.Marvin Farber (ed.) - 1940 - New York,: Greenwood Press.
Cognitivism and Practical Intentionality.Christian Lotz - 2007 - International Philosophical Quarterly 47 (2):153-166.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
106 (#150,670)

6 months
4 (#314,006)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jeffrey Yoshimi
University of California, Merced

Citations of this work

Motivation and Horizon: Phenomenal Intentionality in Husserl.Philip J. Walsh - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (3):410-435.
Naturalization without associationist reduction: a brief rebuttal to Yoshimi.Jesse Lopes - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-9.
Image Consciousness and the Horizonal Structure of Perception.Walter Hopp - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):130-153.
Levinas's Philosophy of Perception.Matt E. M. Bower - 2017 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (4):383-414.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness.J. Kevin O’Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.
On the proper treatment of connectionism.Paul Smolensky - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):1-23.
Experience and judgment: investigations in a genealogy of logic.Edmund Husserl - 1973 - London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Edited by Ludwig Landgrebe.
Toward a neurobiological theory of consciousness.Francis Crick & Christof Koch - 1990 - Seminars in the Neurosciences 2:263-275.

View all 31 references / Add more references