Husserlian Phenomenology: A Unifying Interpretation

Cham: Springer Verlag (2016)
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Abstract

This chapter presents the main formalism of the book, which is used in subsequent chapters to describe a variety of concepts in Husserlian phenomenology, and thereby unify them. A dynamical systems approach to Husserl is introduced, and several dynamical laws of Husserlian phenomenology are described. The first is an expectation rule according to which expectations are determined by what a person knows, sees, and does. The second is a learning rule according to which background knowledge is updated in a specific way when experiences fulfill or frustrate prior expectations. In addition to these rules, a “supervenience function” is described, which associates how a thing is seen with a “trail set,” the set ways that thing is expected to look, relative to all possible ways of moving around it. This function further illustrates the explanatory dimension of phenomenology described in Chap. 2, whereby how we immanently experience things is determined by how we expect them to look relative to counterfactual movement patterns.

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Chapters

Introduction

This chapter introduces and motivates the overall project of the book: to show how a great deal of Husserl’s theory of “world-constitution” can be unified using a relatively compact formalism.

Textual Analysis

This chapter describes the results of a quantitative analysis of key-word searches of the Husserl database in Japan. The concepts of Husserlian phenomenology unified in this study are associated with five term families. The mean occurrences of terms in these families over the course of Husserl’s car... see more

Genetic Phenomenology

In this chapter genetic phenomenology is interpreted using the unifying formalism. Genetic phenomenology studies a priori rules governing changes in phenomenological structures. This can be understood in terms of the learning rule of Chap. 3. As background knowledge changes in virtue of the learning... see more

Intentionality

In this chapter intentional experience is analyzed using the unifying formalism. Such concepts as partial intention, adumbration, fulfillment, and frustration are associated with specific features of the expectation function and supervenience function.

Consitutive Phenomenology

In this chapter constitution and constitutive phenomenology are interpreted using the unifying formalism. Constitution is treated as a relationship between immanent experiences of objects and the counter-factual trail sets that determine them. Constitution as a developmental, “constructive” process ... see more

Horizon Theory

In this chapter the concept of a horizon is interpreted using the unifying formalism. Three distinct types of horizon are distinguished. The horizon can either correspond to our immanent sense of the rest of an object or to one of several counterfactual structures, that correspond to how an object i... see more

The Formalism

This chapter presents the main formalism of the book, which is used in subsequent chapters to describe a variety of concepts in Husserlian phenomenology, and thereby unify them. A dynamical systems approach to Husserl is introduced, and several dynamical laws of Husserlian phenomenology are describe... see more

Conclusion

This chapter provides an overview of the unifying interpretation of Husserl, summarizing the various concepts that have been formalized in a common framework and giving readings of several long passages that illustrate this unification; considers how the formalism could be extended to other domains ... see more

Motivation

In this chapter the concept of motivation is interpreted using the unifying formalism. Different concepts of motivation in Husserl are distinguished. Changes in the “strength” of motivations are interpreted in terms of the learning rule of Chap. 3

The Basic Idea and Other Preliminaries

In this chapter the basic idea of the book is presented in an intuitive way, using the metaphor of a world-model that experience “moves through.” This metaphor illuminates an explanatory dimension of phenomenology, whereby what we actually experience is informed by what expect to be the case in a gi... see more

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Citations of this work

Motivation and Horizon: Phenomenal Intentionality in Husserl.Philip J. Walsh - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (3):410-435.
On the psychologism of neurophenomenology.Jesse Lopes - 2024 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 23 (1):85-104.
Motivation and the Primacy of Perception.Peter Antich - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Kentucky

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