The Conceptual Foundation of Morality

Springer (2021)
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Abstract

This book offers a solution to the ancient philosophical problem regarding the nature and the justification of morality. The importance of this subject matter is obvious, not merely as an abstract philosophical problem, but perhaps even more as a practical challenge, regarding the way we ought to live our lives: the values that ought to direct us, and the ends that we ought to pursue. In the course of this inquiry, a wide array of philosophical topics is explored: the nature of intentional action, and the role played by reason and desires in agency; the question of the final end of agency – better known in ancient terminology as the question of the purpose of life, and in modern terms as the question of the meaning of life; the nature of moral obligations and their rational justification; the challenge posed by determinism for the freedom of the will, with its implications on fatalism and moral responsibility; and normative questions regarding the value of life.

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Chapters

The Value of Life

My intention in this chapter it to achieve better understanding of the rational categorical obligation by exploring its implications for a variety of moral problems and dilemmas regarding the value of life. I begin by arguing that the identification of the final end of rational agency with gaining k... see more

Introduction

In this book, I establish a foundation for a rationalist moral theory, based on a rationalist theory of agency, thus grounding morality in the general demands of agency. The theory of agency, and the moral theory which emerges from it, are developed from a minimalist conception of reason, and based ... see more

Reason, Desires, and Ends

In this chapter I defend a rationalist conception of practical reason. I argue that, far from merely playing an instrumental role, the notion of an intentional action entails that reason can be used by an agent to evaluate final ends and, further, to determine final ends independently of any desires... see more

The End of Rational Agency

In this chapter I outline a rationalist theory of agency. I begin with a minimalist conception of reason, according to which reason only serves an instrumental role. I argue that the use of reason is a necessary condition for determining ends, and thus for agency. Hence, every agent is a rational ag... see more

Freedom, Rationality, and Responsibility

In this chapter I refute skepticism about freedom of the will. I explain how the rationalist moral theory developed earlier in this book gives meaning to the idea of freedom in a deterministic world, by explicating it in terms of rationality. My analysis also sheds light on the notions of responsibi... see more

A Foundation for a Rationalist Moral Theory

In this chapter I show how morality can be justified by reducing moral obligations to practical reason, thus grounding morality in the general demands of agency. I argue that practical reasoning presumes a rational categorical obligation, which sets as an end gaining knowledge of reality. Following ... see more

Conclusion

In this chapter I summarize the conclusions of this investigation, and pave the way for its expansion. This expansion will have to take into account contingent aspects of human life. For it is obvious that, as human agents, we are subjected to moral obligations that derive from the unique contingent... see more

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References found in this work

What do philosophers believe?David Bourget & David J. Chalmers - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):465-500.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Ian Hacking.
Nicomachean ethics.H. Aristotle & Rackham - 2014 - Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.. Edited by C. D. C. Reeve.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

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