Strong Programme against Scientific Knowledge and Its Autonomy

Posseible Düşünme Dergisi 6 (11):34-40 (2017)
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Abstract

Science and scientific knowledge have been questioned in many ways for a long period of time. Especially, after the scientific revolution of 16th- and 17th-century Europe, science and its knowledge have been mainly accepted one of the most valuable and trustable information. However, in 20th century, autonomy of scientific knowledge and its dominant position over other kinds of knowledge have been mainly criticised. Social and other factors that were tried to be excluded before have been incorporated into the work by the influence of the Strong Programme. In this article, it will be argued that while people are presenting scientific knowledge, their interests, beliefs and the communities they are involved in are also shown to be effective in producing this information. Thus, the desired result is that it is not reasonable to talk about the absolute autonomy of scientific knowledge.

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Alper Bilgehan Yardımcı
Pamukkale University

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References found in this work

Knowledge and social imagery.David Bloor - 1976 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Knowledge and Social Imagery.David Bloor - 1979 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30 (2):195-199.
What Is This Thing Called Science?A. F. Chalmers - 1979 - Erkenntnis 14 (3):393-404.
Vienna circle.Thomas Uebel - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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