Seeming incomparability and rational choice

Politics, Philosophy and Economics 21 (4):347-371 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, Volume 21, Issue 4, Page 347-371, November 2022. We sometimes have to choose between options that are seemingly incomparable insofar as they seem to be neither better than, worse than, nor equal to each other. This often happens when the available options are quite different from one another. For instance, consider a choice between prioritizing either criminal justice reform or healthcare reform as a public policy goal. Even after the relevant details of the goals and possible reforms are filled in, it is plausible that neither goal is better than, worse than, nor equal to the other. Such seemingly incomparable options present a problem for rational choice since it is unclear how an agent might rationally choose between them. What we need are some principles to help govern rational choice when faced with seemingly incomparable options. I here present three such principles. While each principle is individually compelling, I show that they are jointly incompatible. I then argue that the correct response to this inconsistent triad is to reject the principle that rationally censures performing a sequence of choices one knows will result in a suboptimal outcome. The upshot is that when seeming incomparability is involved, an agent can money pump themselves without being less rational for it.

Similar books and articles

Parity, incomparability and rationally justified choice.Martijn Boot - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (1):75 - 92.
Is incomparability a problem for anyone?Nien-hê Hsieh - 2007 - Economics and Philosophy 23 (1):65-80.
Value Incomparability and Incommensurability.Ruth Chang - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press.
Is Incomparability a Problem for Anyone?Nien-hê Hsieh - 2007 - Economics and Philosophy 23 (1):65-80.
Incommensurability, incomparability, and rational world-choice.Myron Arthur Penner - 2014 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (1):13-25.
Reasoning without Comparing.David K. Chan - 2010 - American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (2):153-164.
Rational choice theory.William J. Goode - 1997 - American Sociologist 28 (2):22.
Are hard choices cases of incomparability?Ruth Chang - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):106-126.
The small improvement argument.Nicolas Espinoza - 2008 - Synthese 165 (1):127 - 139.
Contrastive rational explanation of free choice.Randolph Clarke - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (183):185-201.
Why Rational Agents Should Not Be Liberal Maximizers.Isaac Levi - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):1-17.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-06-03

Downloads
246 (#75,207)

6 months
101 (#34,321)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

The Argument from Small Improvement is a Red Herring.Thomas Raleigh - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations.Edward Francis McClennen - 1990 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
The possibility of parity.Ruth Chang - 2002 - Ethics 112 (4):659-688.
Subjective Probabilities Should be Sharp.Adam Elga - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10.

View all 16 references / Add more references