Hume ve Benlik
Abstract
Bu yaz?da Hume’un “benlik” ve “ben bilgisi” kuramlar?n? eles,tirel olarak irdelemeye çal?s,t?m. I.lk olarak Hume’un bilgi kuram?n?n genel bir sunumunu yapt?ktan sonra, benlik ve ben bilgisi kuramlar?n? ele al?yorum. Tutarl? bir ampirist olarak Hume basit, maddi olmayan, kendi kendine varl?g(?n? sürdüren ve ölümsüz benlik düs,üncesini reddeder. Hume benlig(in zaman içinde kal?c? olmayan “alg?lar demeti” d?s,?nda bir s,ey olmad?g(?n? iddia eder. Ancak, bu benlik görüs,ü, “benlik özdes,lig(i”, “düs,üncenin öznesi” gibi ciddi epistemolojik ve ontolojik sorunlara yol açar.In this paper I have tried to critically examine Hume’s theory of self and self-knowledge. First, I provide a general exposition of Hume’s theory of knowledge and then an examination of his theory of self and self-knowledge. As a consistent empiricist, Hume denies the existence of simple, immaterial, self-subsistent, and hence immortal self. Hume claims that self is nothing but a ‘bundle of perceptions’ which does not have permanent existence in time. However, this conception of self faces some serious epistemological and ontological problems such as the problem of personal identity, subject of thought, etc.