The troublesome explanandum in Plantinga’s argument against naturalism

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69 (1):1-15 (2011)
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Abstract

Intending to have a constructive dialogue with the combination of evolutionary theory (E) and metaphysical naturalism (N), Alvin Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism (EAAN) takes the reliability of human cognition (in normal environments) as a purported explanandum and E&N as a purported explanans. Then, he considers whether E&N can offer a good explanans for this explanandum, and his answer is negative (an answer employed by him to produce a defeater for N). But I will argue that the whole EAAN goes wrong by assuming that R is a qualified explanandum crying out for scientific explanations, since it cannot meet either of the two criteria for any scientifically qualified explanandum: Realizability Criterion and Informativeness Criterion. Hence, EAAN is simply setting a task that E&N, as a scientific theory, will not care at all. Therefore, EAAN cannot substantially shake E&N

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Citations of this work

Naturalized truth and Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism.Feng Ye - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (1):27-46.

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References found in this work

Warrant and proper function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Warranted Christian Belief.Alvin Plantinga - 2000 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.

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