Theory and Decision 69 (4):497-521 (2010)

A hybrid preference framework is proposed for strategic conflict analysis to integrate preference strength and preference uncertainty into the paradigm of the graph model for conflict resolution (GMCR) under multiple decision makers. This structure offers decision makers a more flexible mechanism for preference expression, which can include strong or mild preference of one state or scenario over another, as well as equal preference. In addition, preference between two states can be uncertain. The result is a preference framework that is more general than existing models which consider preference strength and preference uncertainty separately. Within the hybrid preference structure, four kinds of stability are defined as solution concepts and a post-stability analysis, called status quo analysis, which can be used to track the evolution of a given conflict. Algorithms are provided for implementing the key inputs of stability analysis and status quo analysis within the extended preference structure. The new stability concepts under the hybrid preference structure can be used to model complex strategic conflicts arising in practical applications, and can provide new insights for the conflicts. The method is illustrated using the conflict over proposed bulk water exports from Lake Gisborne in Newfoundland, Canada.
Keywords Hybrid preferences  Strength of preference  Preference uncertainty  Decision analysis  Graph model for conflict resolution
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DOI 10.1007/s11238-009-9134-6
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Equilibria for Far-Sighted Players.D. Marc Kilgour - 1984 - Theory and Decision 16 (2):135-157.
Limited-Move Equilibria in 2 X 2 Games.Frank C. Zagare - 1984 - Theory and Decision 16 (1):1.

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