Abstract
There is deep ambivalence about analogy, both as an object of philosophical fascination and in contexts of practice, like archaeology, where it plays a seemingly central role. In archaeology there has been continuous vacillation between outright rejection of analogical inference as overtly speculative, even systematically misleading, and, when this proves un-tenable, various stock strategies for putting it 'on a firmer foundation'. Frequently these last are accomplished by assimilating analogy to more tractible (better warranted, more readily controllable) forms of inference, salvaging respectability but at the expense, ironically, of reverting to a strategy of elimination. I have been struck by the parallels between this pattern of response and that typical of philosophy; the central question raised in both contexts is that of whether, or in what sense, there is any distinctively analogical form of inference and what sort of warrant (formal, methodological) accrues to it. In what follows I will assess two recent philosophical positions on this question, first in their own terms and then in consideration of archaeological uses of analogy. In this I hope to put the projects of justification themselves on a firmer footing.