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Truth, pluralism, monism, correspondence
In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave-Macmillan (2010)
Abstract
When talking about truth, we ordinarily take ourselves to be talking about one-and-the-same thing. Alethic monists suggest that theorizing about truth ought to begin with this default or pre-reflective stance, and, subsequently, parlay it into a set of theoretical principles that are aptly summarized by the thesis that truth is one. Foremost among them is the invariance principle.Author Profiles
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Citations of this work
Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truth and Objectivity.Jussi Suikkanen - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (2):193-212.
Pluralist theories of truth.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright - 2012 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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