Rule-following without Reasons: Wittgenstein’s Quietism and the Constitutive Question

Ratio 20 (4):481–502 (2007)
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Abstract

This is a short, and therefore necessarily very incomplete discussion of one of the great questions of modern philosophy. I return to a station at which an interpretative train of thought of mine came to a halt in a paper written almost 20 years ago, about Wittgenstein and Chomsky,[1] hoping to advance a little bit further down the track. The rule-following passages in the Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics in fact raise a number of distinct issues about rules, meaning, objectivity, and reasons, whose conflation is encouraged by the standard caption, "the Rule-following Considerations".[2] So, let me begin by explaining my focus here

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Citations of this work

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References found in this work

Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Remarks on the foundations of mathematics.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1956 - Oxford [Eng.]: Blackwell. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe, Rush Rhees & G. H. von Wright.
Being known.Christopher Peacocke - 1999 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Blind reasoning.Paul A. Boghossian - 2003 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77 (1):225-248.

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