How Boots Befooled the King: Wisdom, Truth, and the Stoics

Acta Analytica 27 (2):113-126 (2012)
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Abstract

Abstract   Can the wise person be fooled? The Stoics take a very strong view on this question, holding that the wise person (or sage) is never deceived and never believes anything that is false. This seems to be an implausibly strong claim, but it follows directly from some basic tenets of the Stoic cognitive and psychological world-view. In developing an account of what wisdom really requires, I will explore the tenets of the Stoic view that lead to this infallibilism about wisdom, and show that many of the elements of the Stoic picture can be preserved in a more plausible fallibilist approach. Specifically, I propose to develop a Stoic fallibilist virtue epistemology that is based on the Stoic model of the moral virtues. This model of the intellectual virtues will show that (in keeping with a folk distinction) the wise person is never befooled, though that person might be fooled. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-14 DOI 10.1007/s12136-012-0158-0 Authors Sarah Wright, Department of Philosophy, University of Georgia, 107 Peabody Hall, Athens, GA 30602, USA Journal Acta Analytica Online ISSN 1874-6349 Print ISSN 0353-5150.

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Sarah Wright
University of Georgia

Citations of this work

The Stoic Sage Does not Err: An Error?Scott Aikin - forthcoming - Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences.

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The morality of happiness.Julia Annas - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Complete Works: The Rev. Oxford Translation.Jonathan Barnes (ed.) - 1984 - Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Epistemic responsibility.Lorraine Code - 1987 - Hanover, N.H.: Published for Brown University Press by University Press of New England.

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