Philosophical Issues 23 (1):262-275 (2013)

Authors
Sarah Wright
University of Georgia
Abstract
What is the best model of epistemic agency for virtue epistemology? Insofar as the intellectual and moral virtues are similar, it is desirable to develop models of agency that are similar across the two realms. Unlike Aristotle, the Stoics present a model of the virtues on which the moral and intellectual virtues are unified. The Stoics’ materialism and determinism also help to explain how we can be responsible for our beliefs even when we cannot believe otherwise. In this paper I show how a neo-Stoic model of epistemic agency can address common objections to treating epistemic and moral agency similarly and allow a robust explanatory role for character in determining our actions and beliefs. The picture of epistemic responsibility that flows from this model also explains why we often deserve credit for our knowledge, while demonstrating that the truth of our beliefs is not something for which we are epistemically responsible
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DOI 10.1111/phis.12013
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References found in this work BETA

The Morality of Happiness.Julia Annas - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge as Credit for True Belief.John Greco - 2003 - In Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Clarendon Press. pp. 111-134.

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Citations of this work BETA

Must We Love Epistemic Goods?Charlie Crerar - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4):pqaa072.
The Stoic Sage Does Not Err: An Error?Scott Aikin - forthcoming - Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences.

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