Truth is not (Very) Intrinsically Valuable

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):108-128 (2017)
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Abstract

We might suppose it is not only instrumentally valuable for beliefs to be true, but that it is intrinsically valuable – truth makes a non-derivative, positive contribution to a belief's overall value. Some intrinsic goods are better than others, though, and this article considers the question of how good truth is, compared to other intrinsic goods. I argue that truth is the worst of all intrinsic goods; every other intrinsic good is better than it. I also suggest the best explanation for truth's inferiority is that it is not really an intrinsic good at all. It is intrinsically neutral.

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Author's Profile

Chase Wrenn
University of Alabama

References found in this work

How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
On the aim of belief.David Velleman - 1996 - In J. David Velleman (ed.), The Possibility of Practical Reason. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo). pp. 244--81.
The Possibility of Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):263-275.
Ethics.William Frankena - 1967 - Philosophy of Science 34 (1):74-74.

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