Truth and other self-effacing properties

Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):577–586 (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A “self-effacing” property is one that is definable without referring to it. Colin McGinn (2000) has argued that there is exactly one such property: truth. I show that if truth is a self-effacing property, then there are very many others—too many even to constitute a set.

Similar books and articles

Glaube nicht an mich!: Dürfen Moraltheorien Selbst-Auslöschend sein?P. Baumann - 1997 - Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 30 (77):191-198.
Is Virtue Ethics Self-Effacing?Joel A. Martinez - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):277-288.
Virtue ethics is self-effacing.Simon Keller - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):221 – 231.
Consequentialism and Moral Worth.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (2):117-136.
Truth as a Substantive Property.Douglas Edwards - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):279-294.
Hobbes's Self‐effacing Natural Law Theory.S. A. Lloyd - 2001 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (3-4):285-308.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
69 (#242,874)

6 months
309 (#7,116)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Chase Wrenn
University of Alabama

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of semantics.Alfred Tarski - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (3):341-376.
On propositions.W. D. Hart & Colin McGinn - 1978 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 19 (2):299-306.

Add more references