Proper names and the necessity of identity statements

Synthese 114 (2):319-335 (1998)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

An identity statement flanked on both sides with proper names is necessarily true, Saul Kripke thinks, if it's true at all. Thus, contrary to the received view – or at least what was, prior to Kripke, the received view – a statement like(A) Hesperus is Phosphorus.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,322

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Causality, referring, and proper names.David S. Schwarz - 1978 - Linguistics and Philosophy 2 (2):225 - 233.
Geach on Proper Names.David Boersema - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:37-42.
Proper Names, Contingency A Priori and Necessity A Posteriori.Chen Bo - 2011 - History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (2):119 - 138.
Proper names and persons: Peirce's semiotic consideration of proper names.Eric Thomas Weber - 2008 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 44 (2):pp. 346-362.
Rigidity and De Jure Rigidity.Mark Textor - 1998 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):45-59.
On the linguistic complexity of proper names.Ora Matushansky - 2008 - Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (5):573-627.
Kripke on necessity and identity.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1998 - Philosophical Papers 27 (3):151-159.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
227 (#85,518)

6 months
22 (#118,956)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael J. Wreen
Marquette University

Citations of this work

Identity over time.Andre Gallois - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. V. O. Quine - 1951 - In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.), The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 202-220.
Proper names.John R. Searle - 1958 - Mind 67 (266):166-173.
Reference and Essence.Nathan U. Salmon - 1981 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 173 (3):363-364.

View all 20 references / Add more references