Abstract

Does truth remain an interesting philosophical topic? Deflationists would argue that it does not, for they believe that Tarskian approaches to truth have succeeded in capturing much of our understanding of the concept without the metaphysical baggage and other shortcomings of traditional attempts at definition. ;Philosophers like Donald Davidson, however, have argued that acceptance of Tarski's insights into the workings of the truth predicate require us to say something more about the concept of truth. Davidson argues that truth is a structure we find in the behavior of rational creatures--indeed, that having a concept of truth is in an important sense constitutive of what it is to be a rational creature. And thus it is necessary to explain how truth relates to human practices. ;Heidegger is often taken as an example of a philosopher who sees the task of defining and understanding truth as central to philosophy. As a result, he is criticized for indulging in the sort of metaphysical and speculative approach to truth that Tarski and others have shown us how to avoid. I argue here, however, that Heidegger is best seen as following a strategy regarding truth that is similar in important respects to Davidson's. Heidegger maintains that it is not the concept of truth which requires clarification, but the conditions of truth. These conditions are sought in the way human practices make manifest the things with which we deal about which we have beliefs and make assertions. His early work on unconcealment explores the structural features of these practices. ;The later Heidegger argued that, at least in the west, our practices, and consequently the unconcealment of what is, are shaped by the prevailing understanding of Being. Thus his work on truth focused on how it is that such an understanding of Being happens, as well as an attempt to understand the current mode of unconcealment through an understanding of the history of these understandings of Being