Science, biases, and the threat of global pessimism

Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S467- (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Philip Kitcher rejects the global pessimists' view that the conclusions reached in inquiry are determined by the interests of some segment of the population, arguing that only some inquiries, for example, inquiries into race and gender, are adversely affected by interests. I argue that the biases Kitcher believes affect such inquiries are operative in all domains, but the prevalence of such biases does not support global pessimism. I argue further that in order to address the global pessimists' concerns, the scientific community needs criticism from people with diverse interests and background assumptions.

Similar books and articles

Aid and bias.Keith Horton - 2004 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):545 – 561.
Global Warming and Our Natural Duties of Justice.Aaron Maltais - 2008 - Dissertation, Uppsala University
Globalization and Common Human Interests.Wang Xinyan - 2006 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:173-177.
Global climate change: interests of foreigners.Amarbayasgalan Dorjderem - 2011 - Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics 11 (1):31-37.
The illusory function of dreams: Another example of cognitive bias.Linda Mealey - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):971-972.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
668 (#23,733)

6 months
89 (#45,150)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

K. Brad Wray
Aarhus University