Abstract
Presentation This article is the first English translation of French scholar Patrick Wotling’s extensive research on Nietzsche. In order to understand Nietzsche’s work, Patrick Wotling follows closely Nietzsche’s well-known injunction to his readers: “learn to read me well!” Hence, he seeks to do a close reading of Nietzsche’s texts, which often resemble a seemingly random juxtaposition of ideas, looking for signs that allow the reader to follow Nietzsche’s thought and weave together a correct interpretation. In so doing it is imperative to reject any reading based on an interpretive framework that is not found in the text itself. This approach is tied to the specificity of Nietzsche’s work in that unlike philosophers before him, he does not hold the pursuit of truth to be the genuine goal of philosophy, and therefore does not write traditional systematic treatises. It is thus necessary to use this close reading approach to reveal the new patterns of thought that Nietzsche uses in place of traditional logical frameworks. Using this method, P. Wotling contends that Nietzsche’s thinking is organized along two tightly bound lines: on the one hand there is a genealogical inquiry, which consists of identifying and evaluating the value of values, and on the other hand there is a concern for the cultivation, or breeding (Züchtung) of human life, which aims at putting in place certain values with the goal of elevating humanity and creating human flourishing. The second goal implies the first, meaning that before knowing what values should be instituted, it is necessary to establish the hierarchy of values, in order to identify which ones are the most useful for the cultivation and enrichment of humanity. Abstract What are Nietzsche’s reasons for criticizing truth? How far does such criticism extend, and how does Nietzsche understand the consequences of his position as regards the philosophical praxis? The discovery of a radical opposition between truth and thought shows that being irrefutable cannot be assimilated to being true, and, at the same time, that truth is interpretation. On closer scrutiny, it appears to be not an essence, but a value, that is to say a type of error that has become essential for the continuation of our life, linked to a long process of physical-psychological absorption, and now productive of a deceptive feeling of necessity. As a consequence, philosophy cannot be equated with the pursuit of truth any longer: first, because, as a free spirit, the genuine philosopher is to be thought of as a lover of riddles, shaped on Epicurus’ pattern rather than on Plato’s; and more importantly, because the philosopher’s real aim is to investigate the value of all particular values (including “truth”) for the development of human life, and, in accordance, to create and impose new “truths.”