What makes an explanation

Philosophy of Science 31 (3):241-254 (1964)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Newtonian theory has usually been accepted as a paradigm example of an explanation. There are two widely known analyses of what makes it so. According to one analysis, the deductive and predictive nature of the theory is what counts. The second analysis emphasizes the ability of the theory to connect widely different events and laws. The present paper proposes a third analysis stressing three characteristics. (1) The explanation includes a description which is in part of something unobserved. (2) The description is true in the sense of corresponding to the facts. (3) Through the description, the explanation confers "naturalness" upon the thing explained

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,139

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Dynamics of Non-Being.Bradford Skow - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10.
Reintroducing prediction to explanation.Heather E. Douglas - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (4):444-463.
The Limits of Explanation.Richard Swinburne - 1990 - Philosophy 27 (Supplement):177 - 193.
The Ontology of Explanation.David-Hillel Ruben - 1989 - In Fred D'Agostino & I. C. Jarvie (eds.), Freedom and Rationality. Reidel. pp. 67--85.
Covering law explanation.Thomas Nickles - 1971 - Philosophy of Science 38 (4):542-561.
Reason explanation in folk psychology.Joshua Knobe - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):90–106.
An argument against the causal theory of action explanation.Scott R. Sehon - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):67-85.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
245 (#78,208)

6 months
7 (#285,926)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references